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Summary 
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Abstract
The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique
in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First,
diﬀerent equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinal-
ity, despite ﬁxed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be diﬀerent equilibrium
action proﬁles with the same size. Second, provided a Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium exists, diﬀerent message rules and beliefs can hold in other
equilibria inducing the same action proﬁle.
Keywords: sender-receiver games, strategic information transmission
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1 Introduction
Crawford and Sobel’s seminal paper (1982) concerning one-shot sender-receiver
games is an essential reference for most of the literature in strategic information
transmission. In particular, multi-stage games often rely on the uniqueness
of per-stage equilibrium solutions. However, Crawford and Sobel substantially
assume that equilibria are unique.
In particular, Crawford and Sobel (1982) consider the following one-shot
game of strategic communication. The payoﬀ of two agents, N and E, depend
on action a and the true state of the world ω. Agent N has prior beliefs about
the state of the world, that are represented by a non-degenerate distribution
function. Instead, agent E can observe the true state perfectly. First, agent E
sends a message to agent N, then agent N chooses action a and the payoﬀ are
realized. Crawford and Sobel show that Nash Bayesian equilibria are partitional:
agent E will introduce noise into his signal so that only one action will be
implemented for all the states that belong to the same element of the equilibrium
∗Address: Dipartimento di Statistica, Università di Milano-Bicocca, via Bicocca degli
Arcimboldi 8, 20126 Milano, Italy, email: irene.valsecchi@unimib.it, tel. +39-02-64485820,
fax +39-02-6473312
1partition. Moreover, equilibrium partitions will have ﬁnite cardinality, i.e. the
state space will be partitioned into a ﬁnite number of proper subsets.
Crawford and Sobel impose a particular monotonicity condition on the equi-
librium solutions. That condition implies that a unique equilibrium partition
with cardinality I can exist. Moreover, they consider only uniform message
rules, i.e. agent E will choose a message from the equilibrium subset Mi ran-
domly, according to a uniform distribution, if the true state lies in the equilib-
rium subset  i.
The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique for the
game of Crawford and Sobel under two diﬀerent respects. First, an equilibrium
partition with cardinality I need not be unique. In particular, provided an equi-
librium partition of the state space with I elements is unique under some prior
distribution function, that partition can be shown to belong to the non-singular
subset of equilibrium partitions with the same size under other distribution
functions. Consequently, there can be diﬀerent equilibrium action proﬁles for
partitions with the same cardinality.
Second, Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique because the equi-
librium message rule and, hence, the equilibrium beliefs are not unique. In
particular, provided a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists under some prior dis-
tribution function with a unique equilibrium proﬁle of actions and a particular
equilibrium message rule, there will be other Perfect Bayesian equilibria under
the same distribution function with the same equilibrium proﬁle of actions but
diﬀerent message rules and equilibrium beliefs.
2 Set-up
Assumption 1 : the payoﬀs of the agents N and E depend on the action a
and the state of nature ω. Action a belongs to the action space A, that is an
interval of real numbers, while the state space   is the closed unit interval on
the real line. In particular, agent N has a twice continuously diﬀerentiable
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function UN (a,ω); agent E has a twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function UE (a,ω,b),
where b is a scalar parameter. The utility functions are such that:
given ω, ∃a ∈ A : Ui
a (•) = 0, with i = N,E (1)
U i
aa (•) < 0 ∨ a ∈ A, with i = N,E (2)
Ui
aω (•) > 0 with i = N,E (3)




a Ui (•), i = N,E (4)
Parameter b in agent E’s utility function is a measure of the conﬂict of
interest between the agents. In particular:
2Assumption 2 : the scalar parameter b is such that in (4) the best action aE
ω
for a perfectly informed agent E is always lower than the best action aN
ω for a
perfectly informed agent N1. Only agent E observes the true state of nature.
Instead, agent N has prior beliefs about the state of nature that are represented
by the distribution function (d.f.) F (ω), with continuous probability density
function f (ω) such that f (ω) > 0 for every ω in (0,1) 2.
First, agent E observes ω, then he chooses and sends one message m to agent
N. The cardinality of the set M of messages is not lower than the cardinality
of  . Agent N receives message m and, then, he chooses one action a in A.
Once the action is selected by agent N, the payoﬀs are realized.
All aspects of the game except ω are common knowledge.
Agent E chooses a message rule, i.e. a set of generalized probability density
functions, denoted {ϕ(m | ω)}, with cardinality | |, such that
￿
M ϕ(m | ω)dm =
1 for each state ω. Agent N chooses an action rule, i.e. a set of generalized
probability density functions, denoted {α(a | m)}, with cardinality |M|, such
that
￿
A α(a | m)da = 1 for each message m. Let ρ(ω | m) denote agent N’s
probability density function of ω conditional on having received message m. A
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a pair of message rule {ϕ∗(m | ω}) and action
rule {α∗(a | m)}, and a system of beliefs {ρ∗ (ω | m)} such that:
1) the equilibrium message rule maximizes agent E’s expected payoﬀ for
every state ω given the equilibrium action rule;
2) the equilibrium action rule maximizes agent N’s expected payoﬀ for every
message m where the expectation satisﬁes the following condition:
 ∗
m = {ω | ϕ∗(m | ω) > 0}  = ∅ → (5)
ρ∗ (ω | m) =
ϕ∗(m | ω)f(ω) ￿
 ∗
m ϕ∗(m | ω)f(ω)dω
∨ ω ∈  ∗
m; ρ∗ (ω | m) = 0 ∨ ω / ∈  ∗
m
3 Results
Proposition 1 is Theorem 1 in Crawford and Sobel (1982, p.1437) adapted to
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, instead of Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1 :
1) every Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is partitional, i.e.:
- there exists a partition of M into I∗ disjoint subsets M∗
i , i = 1,...I∗.
- There exists a partition of   into I∗ subsets denoted  ∗






i for (I∗ − 1) elements of the partition at least; the equilib-









ϕ∗(m | ω / ∈  ∗
i)dm = 0
1All the results hold for the analogous case in which aE
ω is always greater than aN
ω .
2If the density function f (ω) were nil for non-empty subsets of the state space, then there
could be diﬀerent partitions of the state space substantially equivalent with respect to the
induced action proﬁle, given the prior beliefs.
3- There exists a proﬁle of I∗ actions denoted a∗






UN(a,ω)ρ∗ (ω | m ∈ M∗
i )dω
given (5).
2) Every equilibrium partition has a ﬁnite number I∗of elements.
3) If there exists an equilibrium partition with cardinality I∗ > 1, then there
will be an equilibrium partition with cardinality (I∗ − 1).







H,I∗ denote the equilibrium partition of the state space with
cardinality I∗ under the d.f. H(ω).
Crawford and Sobel (1982, p.1444) assume that the following monotonicity
condition holds in equilibrium:
Condition 1 M: given P∗












i,˜ I∗ for all i ≥ 2.
Condition M implies that there will be a unique equilibrium partition for
each cardinality of the partitions: if P∗
F,I∗ and P∗
F,˜ I∗ exist, then I∗ will be lower
than ˜ I∗.
The paper shows that the one-to-one correspondence between cardinality
and equilibrium partition will not hold if Crawford and Sobel’s monotonicity
condition is dropped. The following Corollary and Lemma are useful in order to
prove that multiple equilibrium partitions with the same cardinality can exist.
In particular, Lemma 1 shows that identical action proﬁles will be induced under
prior distribution functions deﬁned on the same support and having equal mean,
provided UN
aωω (•) is equal to zero3.
Corollary 1 :
￿




> 0 is a necessary condition for
the existence of P∗
F,I∗ with I∗ > 1.
Lemma 1 : provided UN
aωω (•) = 0, then aH will be equal to aK if the d.f.
H (ω) and the d.f. K (ω) have the same mean.
Proposition 2 proves in the following way that Perfect Bayesian equilibria
need not be unique. Suppose that under the prior d.f. in the following way. there
exists a unique P∗
F,I∗ with the correspondingly unique equilibrium action proﬁle
aF,I∗. Consider another d.f. G(ω) that both satisﬁes the marginal likelihood
ratio property with respect to the prior d.f. F (ω), and induces a unique P∗
G,I∗
3The condition UN
aωω (•) = 0 is satisﬁed by a class of commonly used utility functions.
Crawford and Sobel (1982, p. 1440)) assume that UN (a,ω) = −(a − ω)2 in an example.
4with unique equilibrium action proﬁle aG,I∗. First-order stochastic dominance
between the distribution functions and MLRP will imply a complete ordering
of the upper and lower bounds of all the subsets in P∗
F,I∗ and P∗
G,I∗. Given that
ranking, there will exist another d.f. Y (ω), that is a mixture of distribution




Proposition 2 : suppose that there exists a unique P∗
F,I∗ with I∗ > 1. Provided
UN
aωω (•) = 0, there exist other distribution functions Y (ω) such that the set of
P∗
Y,I∗ is non-singular and contains P∗
F,I∗.
Given Proposition 2 there can be diﬀerent equilibrium action proﬁles notwith-
standing the same cardinality of the equilibrium partitions: under the d.f. Y (ω)
both aF,I∗ and aG,I∗ will be equilibrium action proﬁles.
Proposition 3 shows that an equilibrium message rule is not unique even in
correspondence to a unique P∗
F,I∗. In particular, represent agent N’s posterior
beliefs as distribution functions. If an equilibrium message rule supports a
posterior d.f. H (ω), then all the message rules inducing posterior distribution
functions with the same mean of H (ω) and rankable with respect to H (ω)
according to second-order stochastic dominance will be equilibrium message
rules.
Proposition 3 : suppose that there exists a unique P∗
F,I∗. Provided UN
aωω (•) =
0, the equilibrium message rule and beliefs are not unique under the d.f. F (ω).
4 Conclusions
The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the
strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Consequently,
there is not a correspondence which associates with each cardinality of the
equilibrium partitions one and only one equilibrium action proﬁle for every
prior distribution function. Moreover, the equilibrium message rules and beliefs
are not unique for given prior beliefs.
Non-uniqueness of one-shot equilibria can be relevant for multi-stage games
of strategic communication.
5 Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 1
Step 1. From strict concavity in (2), there will be a unique action that
maximizes agent i’s expected payoﬀ function for each d.f. F(ω). Hence, agent
N will never use mixed strategies, whatever his beliefs {ρ(ω | m)}. Agent N’s







a (am,ω)ρ(ω | m)dω = 0
￿
(7)
5Suppose that the d.f. H (ω) dominates the d.f. K(ω) in the sense of ﬁrst








a(aK,•)dK(ω)dω = 0 (8)








a(aH,•)dK(ω)dω → aH > aK (9)
From (9) the best value of a for the fully informed agent i in (4) is a contin-
uous, strictly monotonic function of the true value of ω, i.e.:
ai
ω > ai
ω′ ←→ ω > ω′ with i = N,E (10)
Let Ai be the set of the ai







⊆ A with i = N,E;
￿ ￿Ai￿ ￿ = | | with i = N,E (11)
From (7) and (11):
AM ⊆ AN (12)
Let:
I = |AM| (13)





Step 2. Rank all the elements in AM in the following way:
AM = {a1,...,ai,...,aI | ai−1 < ai < ai+1}
Let:
Mi = {m | ˜ a(m) = ai} with i = 1,...,I
 i =
￿
ω | UE (ai,ω,b) ≥ UE (aj,ω,b) ∨ aj ∈ (AM \ ai)
￿
with i = 1,...,I
By construction,
￿I
i=1  i =  . From (2):




ai > aj and ω ∈  i ∩  j → aj < aE
ω < ai
From (14), if ω ∈  i ∩  j and aj < ai−1, then either aE
ω ∈ (aj,ai−1] and
ω / ∈  i, or aE
ω ∈ [ai−1,ai) and ω / ∈  j, that is contradictory. Hence:
ω ∈  i → ω / ∈  j ∨ j < i − 1,∨j > i + 1 (15)
From (3) the utility functions have increasing diﬀerences in (a,ω) (Milgrom-
Shannon (1994)), i.e.:
Ui (a,ω,•)−Ui (a′,ω,•) > Ui (a,ω′,•)−Ui (a′,ω′,•) ∨a > a′, ω > ω′ (16)
6From (16):
 i ∩  j  = ∅ → | i ∩  j| = 1 (17)
ai > aj and ω ∈  i and ω′ ∈  j → ω > ω′ ∨ ω  = ω′
Finally from (15) and (17):
ai > ap > aj and  i, j  = ∅ →  p  = ∅ (18)
From (14) − (18):
 i  = ∅ →  i = [ωi,ωi] with ωi ≤ ωi (19)
ω ∈  i → ai−1 < aE
ω < ai+1
 i−1, i  = ∅ → ωi−1 ≤ ωi;  i, i+1  = ∅ → ωi ≤ ωi+1




 i−1 ∩  i  = 0 → ωi−1 = ωi; ai−1 < aE
ωi < ai (20)
Finally, given AM, let {˜ ϕ(m | ω)} denote the message rule that maximizes
agent E’s payoﬀ. From (19) − (20):
ω / ∈  i →
￿
Mi






˜ ϕ(m | ω)dm = 1(21)
ω ∈  i−1 ∩  i →
￿
Mi−1∪Mi
˜ ϕ(m | ω)dm = 1
Step 3. Let:
Li = {m | m ∈ Mi and ˜ ϕ(m | ω) > 0 for some ω ∈  i}
From (9) and (19)−(21) a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium must be such that:
| ∗
i| > 1 → L∗
i  = ∅;
￿ ωi
ωi
ρ∗ (ω | m ∈ L∗













i  = ∅; ρ∗ (ω | m ∈ L∗
i) = 1; a∗
i = aN
ω (22)
Step 4. From Assumption (2), since aE
0 < aN
0 , given (12), 0 ∈  ∗
1 in equilib-
rium.
Suppose that in equilibrium some  ∗
i is such that  ∗
i = ˘ ω / ∈
￿
p =i  ∗
p. From
(22), aE
˘ ω < a∗
i = aN
˘ ω . If ˘ ω < 1. given (19) and continuity, then  ∗
i+1  = ∅ and
there will a ω′′ such that aE
˘ ω < aE
ω′′ ≤ a∗
i < a∗
i+1; but, from (10) and (19), if
aE
˘ ω < aE
ω′′, then ω′′ > ˘ ω and ω′′ / ∈  ∗




ω′′ / ∈  ∗
j with j ≥ i+1, that is contradictory. Instead, if ˘ ω = 1, given (16) and
continuity, then  ∗
i−1  = ∅ and
￿
UE (a∗












will be strictly negative:
7there will be a ω′ such that UE (a∗








i| > 1 that is contradictory.
Now suppose that in equilibrium some  ∗
i is such that  ∗
i = ˘ ω =  ∗
i+1. If








i+2  = ∅. However, given
(10) and continuity, there will be a ω′′ such that aE




ω′′ > ˘ ω and ω′′ / ∈  ∗

























, ω′ < 1 and ω′ / ∈  ∗
j with j < i, that is contradictory.
If a∗
i = aN
1 , then  ∗
i+1 = ∅, that is contradictory.
Suppose that  ∗
i = ˘ ω and  ∗
i+1 = [˘ ω,ωi+1] with ˘ ω < ωi+1. Since 0 ∈  ∗
1,
















, ω′ < ˘ ω and ω′ / ∈  ∗
j with j < i, that is contradictory.
Hence, given (13), a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium must be such that:
∃ ∗
i :  ∗
i ⊇ 1 and i ∈ {I∗ − 1,I∗}
￿ ￿ ∗
j
￿ ￿ > 1 ∨ j ∈ {1,...,I∗ − 1}
ω∗
j−1 = ω∗
j ∨ j ∈ {1,...,I∗}
I∗ < ∞
Step 5. There always exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with a unique ac-
tion level played with probability one. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium
partition with cardinality I∗ greater than 1 and:
a∗
i−1 and  ∗
i−1 = [ωi−2,ωi−1]; a∗
i and  ∗
i = [ωi−1,ωi]
a∗
i+1 and  ∗
i+1 = [ωi,ωi+1] 2 ≤ i < I∗
Given (16), if ω ∈ (ωi−1,ωi), then:
UE (a∗





















It follows that UE (a,ω,b) is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing from a∗
i−1
to a∗













UE (ˆ ai,ω,b) − UE (ˆ ai−1,ω,b)
￿
= 0 for ω ∈
(ωi−1,ωi). Since there exists an equilibrium partition with cardinality I∗, then:
∃m′ ∈ L∗
i−1 with ϕ∗ (m′ | ω); ∃m ∈ L∗
i with ϕ∗ (m | ω)
∃m′′ ∈ L∗
i+1 with ϕ∗ (m′′ | ω)












with cardinality (I∗ − 1), where ω1 < ω′
1, ωi < ω′




∃ˆ m ∈ L
′





∃ˆ m ∈ L
′





∃ˇ m ∈ L
′





∃ˇ m ∈ L
′
i : ϕ(ˇ m | ω) = ϕ∗ (m′′ | ω) ∨ ω ∈ [ωi,ω′
i]










dω, then ˆ ai−1 <
a∗
i−1 < ˆ ai < a∗






, there will exist
an equilibrium partition with cardinality (I∗ − 1).
Proof. of Corollary 1
From Proposition 1 point 3, if there exists a P∗
F,I∗ with I∗ > 2, there will ex-
ists an equilibrium P∗
F,2. Consider an equilibrium P∗
F,2. The following condition
must hold:
UE (a∗
2,ω,b) > UE (a∗
1,ω,b) ∨ ω ∈ (ω∗
1,1] (23)
Let F1 (ω | q) be the d.f. F (ω) conditional on  1 = [0,q] and F2 (ω | q) be the
d.f. F (ω) conditional on  2 = [q,1]. From (6), aF1(q) and aF2(q) will be unique
for every q. From (22), aN
0 = aF1(0). Hence, aN
0 < aF1(q) < aF < aF2(q) for
every q ∈ (0,1). From strict concavity in (2),
￿
UE (aF,1,b) − UE (aF2(q),1,b)
￿
will be strictly positive if
￿
UE (aF1(q),1,b) − UE (aF,1,b)
￿
is nonnegative, while ￿
UE (aF1(q),1,b) − UE (aF,1,b)
￿

















UE (aF1(q),1,b) will be greater than UE (aF,1,b), that is greater than UE (aF2(q),1,b).
Given increasing diﬀerences in (16), UE (aF1(q),ω,b) will be greater than UE (aF2(q),ω,b) for
every ω ∈  , in contradiction with (23).
Proof. of Lemma 1




ω[dH (ω) − dK (ω)] = −
￿
 





















[H(t) − K (t)]dt
￿
dω = 0
Proof. of Proposition 2
















Let F1(ω) denote the d.f. F (ω) conditional on ω in [0,ω∗
F], and F2(ω) de-
note the d.f. F (ω) conditional on ω in [ω∗





















Consider the set Ψ of distribution functions G(ω) with continuous den-
sity functions g (ω) such that (g/f) is decreasing on   (MLRP, (Karlin-Rubin
(1956)). Hence, each G(ω) is dominated by F(ω) in the sense of ﬁrst order










∨ x ≤ k, k ∈   (25)
There will be some d.f. ˜ G(ω) in Ψ such that the expected ω under ˜ G(ω),




. Given strict concavity in (2), under the d.f. ˜ G the necessary condition
stated by Corollary 1 will be satisﬁed. Hence, under the d.f. ˜ G there will exists a

















. Moreover, given (25), ω∗
˜ G will be lower than ω∗
F. Hence:













 3 = [ω∗
F,1]
and let H1 (ω) denote a d.f. on  1, H2 (ω) a d.f. on  2 and H3 (ω) a d.f. on  3
such that:
EH1 [ω] = E ˜ G1 [ω]; EH2 [ω] = ˜ ω with ˜ ω ∈ ˜   ∩  2; EH3 [ω] = EF2 [ω]
where ˜   =
￿
EF1 [ω],E ˜ G2 [ω]
￿
. Consider the following d.f. Y (ω):
Y (ω) = α1H1 (ω) ∨ ω ∈  1; Y (ω) = α1 + α2H2 (ω) ∨ ω ∈  2
Y (ω) = α1 + α2 + α3H3 (ω) ∨ ω ∈  3
where αi ≥ 0 and
￿




EF2 [ω] − E ˜ G2 [ω]
￿
{˜ ω − EF1 [ω]}/∆
α2 =
￿
EF2 [ω] − E ˜ G2 [ω]
￿￿





EF1 [ω] − E ˜ G1 [ω]
￿￿





EF2 [ω] − E ˜ G2 [ω]
￿
{˜ ω − EF1 [ω]} +
￿
EF1 [ω] − E ˜ G1 [ω]
￿
{EF2 [ω] − ˜ ω}
then:
EY [ω | ω ∈  1] = E ˜ G1 [ω]; EY [ω | ω ∈  1 ∪  2] = EF1 [ω]
EY [ω | ω ∈  2 ∪  3] = E ˜ G2 [ω]; EY [ω | ω ∈  3] = EF2 [ω]
10Given Lemma 1, under the d.f. Y (ω) both P∗
F,2 and P∗
˜ G,2 will be equilibrium
partitions.
Proof. of Proposition 3
Under Assumption 2, let Fi (ω) be the d.f. F (ω) conditional on  i = [ωi,ωi]
with ωi < ωi, and fi (ω) be its density function, continuous at each point of  i.
Then, [ωfi (ω)] is integrable on  i, and fi (ω) is positive for every ω ∈ (ωi,ωi).







continuous on [ω′,ωi] since both
￿ ω
ω′ tfi (t)dt and
￿ ω
ω′ fi (t)dt are continuous at







lower than ˜ ω. Given:
 A = [ω,ωa]  B = [ω,ωb] with ωb > ωa > ω
 C = [ωc,ω]  D = [ωd,ω] with ω > ωd > ωc
let:




 i fi (t)dt
∨ ω ∈  i; Hi (ω) = 1 ∨ ω > ωi
i = A,B




 i fi (t)dt
∨ ω ∈  i;Hi (ω) = 1 ∨ ω > ω
i = C,D
HB (ω) dominates HA (ω), and HD (ω) dominates HC (ω) in the sense of ﬁrst










From the intermediate value theorem for continuous functions, there exists





= ˜ ω (26)
Let:
 iI = [ωi,ω′),  II = [ω′,ω′′],  III = (ω′′,ωi]





 iII tfi (t)dt
￿
 iII fi (t)dt
→
￿
 iI∪ iIII tfi (t)dt
￿
 iI∪ iIII fi (t)dt
=
￿
 iII tfi (t)dt
￿
 iII fi (t)dt
(27)








 iI∪ iIII fi (t)dt + q
￿
 iii fi (t)dt






 iI∪ iIII fi (t)dt + q
￿
 iII fi (t)dt








From (28), the d.f. F′
i (ω) will be greater than the d.f. F (ω) for every
ω ∈  iI; instead, the d.f. Fi (ω) will be greater than the d.f. F′
i (ω) for every
ω ∈  iIII. Moreover, there will be a ˆ ω in (ω′,ω′′) such that the d.f. F′
i (ω) is
greater than Fi (ω) for every ω ∈ [ω′, ˆ ω), while the d.f. Fi (ω) is greater than the
d.f. F′
i (ω) for every ω ∈ (ˆ ω,ω′′]. From (29) and (24), given the single crossing
property between the distribution functions (Diamond-Stiglitz (1974)), Fi′(ω)
will be a mean preserving spread of Fi (ω).
Suppose that under F (ω) there exists a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium such
that  i belongs to the equilibrium partition. From Proposition 1, given ω in  i,
a constant ϕ∗ (m | ω) for every m in Mi is an equilibrium message rule. Given
Lemma 1 and m,m′ in Mi, the message rule:
{´ ϕ
∗ (m | ω) = pϕ∗ (m | ω), ´ ϕ
∗ (m′ | ω) = (1 − p)ϕ∗ (m | ω)} ∨ω ∈ ( iI ∪  iIII)
{´ ϕ
∗ (m | ω) = qϕ∗ (m | ω), ´ ϕ
∗ (m′ | ω) = (1 − q)ϕ∗ (m | ω) } ∨ω ∈  iII
will be an equilibrium message rule as well.
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